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Annex D to
PSB D-35 (1/5/53)
January 12, 1953

ANNEX D

REPORT OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

1. What activities are you engaging in which are psychologically significant for attaining national objectives?

EUROPE

MSA information services, largely integrated with USIS in Western Europe, stressed the following themes during the period under review:

1. Confidence in the strength of the United States and in the permanence of the NATO alliance.
 2. That the United States seeks peace with freedom through collective security and with armed readiness as a necessary barrier to Soviet aggression.
 3. That local Communists are tools of the Soviet which seeks to use them to create economic dislocation, to retard defense build-up and to manipulate neutralists to the Soviet advantage.
 4. Encouragement of the support of European bodies such as the Coal and Steel Community and the EDC.
 5. Continuing maximum utilization of MSA economic support and productivity campaigns as evidence of American concern for economic as well as military security in the Free World.
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2. (a) What is your estimate of the psychological effectiveness of MSA and the key reasons therefor?

While it is difficult to evaluate the direct effectiveness of MSA psychological operations, our missions report the following points as of possible psychological significance:

- (1) A continuing slow decline in Communist strength in all MSA countries with the possible exception of Italy and Greece. Even in France and Italy there is no indication of the Communist Party's ability effectively to disrupt NATO defenses or political programs or to attract new members.
- (2) A noticeable increase in the confidence of the NATO powers to deter aggression.
- (3) The continued inability of neutralist elements unwilling to work directly with the Communists to achieve effective organization, although

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in France and Germany their strength, particularly among intellectuals, is significant.

(4) A general increase in the acceptance by European media of information materials on the Mutual Security Program.

(5) Increased availability and use of unattributed U.S. information materials.

(6) A general increase of non-inspired comments of a generally pro-western anti-Russian nature.

(7) Increasing favorable results from the use of non-political, semi-technical information services, especially connected with European productivity programs.

(8) Uncertainty about the future U.S. foreign policy, particularly the continuation of economic aid, during the Presidential electoral campaign, somewhat handicapped psychological operations during the period. This, however, was somewhat offset by the high regard for both candidates among Europeans, and coincidences such as the Slansky trial and Russian rejection of the Indian resolution on Korea.

2. (b) What new evidence emerged during the quarter concerning psychological effectiveness of activities occurring before period reported?

None.

3. What significant progress was made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means of contributing to the national psychological effort?

Integration of USIS and MSA information activities in most European countries has improved the potential of our psychological objectives.

Good results have been obtained from the increased use of European employees, increased use of unattributed material, and the adaptation of pamphlets, articles and other materials written for one country in other nations.

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There has been an improvement in planning and operations with respect to U.S. troop-community problems.

The information services of the official Representative for Europe, in cooperation with HICOG, Public Affairs Division, is completing one major public opinion study and planning another to ascertain the reasons for European attitudes, and is also planning a more effective program to evaluate techniques in this field.

4. What need is felt for change in policies, plans, capabilities or organization with a view to more effective conduct of the national psychological effort?

MSA suggests no major changes. However, the continued availability of counterpart funds is essential for the success of increased use of local materials which are usually more effective than those produced in the United States.

More adequate orientation of U.S. personnel, civilian as well as military, prior to departure for Europe is urged by several of our missions.

SRE is planning to establish, in cooperation with other agencies, a Europe-wide information research service center. Administrative difficulties in connection with this project are numerous. Systematic information programming would be helped materially by such a service center.

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January 12, 1953SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. What psychologically significant activities have been carried out and with what effect on (a) the problem of neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom?

Most MSA missions have not attacked neutralism directly. Where neutralist groups or personalities have been used directly by the Communist Party, information officers have pointed this out, using indigenous channels. In the cases of sincere neutralists who avoided contact with the Communist Party, we have felt that even indirect American counterattack would be harmful and certainly would be considered improper interference. The program of identifying the USSR as the aggressor, and the US as the organizer of peace, plus exposes of Soviet totalitarianism and emphasis on US-European common liberal cultural tradition, is designed to minimize neutralism, and as previously noted, it has contributed to the inability of neutralists to organize politically. The Slansky trials, full reports and analyses of which SRE has circulated through an independent international news agency, was the most severe blow of the quarter to neutralism in intellectual circles. Two important new programs are the USIE/Italy-SRE anti-Communist Party exhibit for the Italian 1953 elections and the new much-needed labor information program in Iceland.

(b) problems of encouraging European unity and securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and EDC treaty?

Information support of the general theme of integration was kept at a high level with editorial, newsreel and radio output as well as the continued success of the Train of Europe (under OEEC sponsorship). In Yugoslavia, which is not involved in integration projects, US information has helped to popularize recent Yugo-Greek-Turkish agreements. SRE and mission support of EDC and German contractual agreements in specific terms has been limited in accordance with State Department directive. In general, the

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integration keynote was effectively sounded in Germany in output for the trade-union and general press with regard to the Schuman Plan. Five travelling exhibits were paid for by MSA and sponsored by the "European Movement," an unofficial organization with the objective of fostering European unity.

(c) Soviet "hate-America" propaganda?

The "Hate America" campaign was answered primarily through positive content of SRE information programs and USIS activity. USIS also has primary responsibility for answering Russian charges based on distortion of events in the Korean war. The Vienna Peace Conference, in accordance with State Department's guidances was given "deep freeze" treatment except in Austria, where integrated USIS-MSA Information Division did an effective job of exposing its Kremlin inspiration and contributed to keeping local support minimal.

(d) Allied position in West Berlin?

Nothing significant to report outside of Germany and Austria, where all media gave full publicity to Linse case. (Linse, an anti-Communist West German, was kidnapped by Communists and dragged across the border to East Germany.) In the rest of Europe, press coverage was generally good.

2. (a) What changes occurred in level, character, or effectiveness of US propaganda activities on both sides of the Iron Curtain in broadcasting?

In Austria new transmitters in Vienna and Linz were put into operation, with some listeners in satellites. The Yugoslav national radio has been using MSA material increasingly in its broadcasts which penetrate the iron curtain. Some reception of MSA Greek radio programs in limited areas of Albania and Bulgaria is reported.

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newsreel and radio materials are unattributed. Pamphlet publishing arrangements have been made with the European Movement. Trade union production included insertion of articles in the labor press of all countries and regular contracts with free union federations for a specified amount of space in Germany, Austria and Italy. Distribution throughout Europe of non-inspired but sharply useful publications is increasing. Special issues of the British magazine "Twentieth Century" on the Soviet system, and on European integration, are distributed by SRE in cooperation with MSA's UK mission. This is believed to have been particularly successful.

3. To what extent have psychological objectives been furthered through your activities in collaboration with (a) major international organizations, NATO, UN and SHAPE?

Virtually all non-press work for NATO and SHAPE was done by MSA -- production of newsreels, film series, radio shows and NATO caravan by SRE. Primary concentration was on NATO, including full coverage of NATO maneuvers in member countries. Success of the "NATO Caravan" was attested by such facts as its being visited by 800,000 people in Athens and Salonika alone. The psychological impact on NAC December meeting cannot yet be definitely estimated. MSA fears that it will encourage relaxation of support for NATO defense program and criticism of forthcoming country budgets, particularly if the current European assumption of a sharp reduction in US economic and military assistance is confirmed.

(b) Non-governmental organizations and individuals in US?

None.

(c) Federal agencies other than MSA and member PSB agencies?

Not significant.

4. What attention has been paid to obtaining optimum psychological results from the presence of US personnel (civilian and military) in foreign countries? Particularly to what extent have personnel selection and indoctrination been adapted to this purpose?

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Good working relationship with the military exists in Germany, and the newly created USIE-MEC-armed force committee promises improvement in Austria, where hitherto presence of American armed personnel in Salzburg area has been a major psychological problem. The necessity for more state-side orientation of American personnel is stressed. In the UK, extensive use has been made of visiting Americans such as Fulbright students, but it is felt there that nothing should be done to call any more attention to presence of US troops. Extensive indoctrination of American personnel is a regular part of the work of the Embassy and MSA Mission in Greece and Yugoslavia. In Paris, the Franco-American Troop Relations Committee under a French Chairman has been eminently successful.

5. What use has been made of show of military force (including atomic weapons test) as psychological device?

While the importance of the "strength of the West" theme, and assurances of permanent American military guarantees, is universally appreciated, the "show of force" approach is viewed as a possible boomerang in most posts. The Report from UK states: "The British are aware and confident of US strength; a danger exists that over-emphasis of this strength will further the notion that US intentions are basically military rather than peace-preserving." Almost identical comment came from French mission. On the other hand more publicity for increasingly efficient local forces was encouraged by all missions, and European governments generally were cooperative in this respect. Continued emphasis on this and on NATO is urged. HICOG and MSA/Germany have already prepared plans for popularizing the proposed German contribution to EDC as a contribution to defense of democratic Europe, to go into effect upon ratification of the accords. Additional comments:

Continuance of economic support, and concern for economic stability in OSP administration has been of major psychological value in countering

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Communist propaganda about US aims, MSA has also been successful in stimulating unattributed articles showing that Russia, not US, is responsible for decline of East-West trade in non-strategic materials. The contrary theme remains an important one in Soviet propaganda. Where productivity programs have been administered in good faith by local governments and private groups, attention to industrial efficiency has continued a useful demonstration of US concern with living standards. Unfortunately, during the past quarter, the failure of local governments and industrialists to conduct the program along MSA-encouraged lines has weakened its appeal in some countries. However, in the UK, the MSA mission has assisted in the establishment of a universally accepted British Productivity Council to replace AACF. In Austria, one of the countries where the local program is under labor attack, the unions have made it clear that it is the local administration of the program, not its American intent, that is at fault.

FAR EAST

1. What activities are you engaging in which are psychologically significant for attaining national objectives?

In Formosa we have publicized the activities of MSA and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (staffed by Chinese and Americans), and the economic gains made on the island through effective utilization of U.S. aid. In Formosa, as well as Thailand, Indochina and the Philippines where MSA also operates, we have supported the objectives of MSA programs which are designed to strengthen local governments and people. We have stressed the importance of attaining national strength through improving the economies of the nations.

In Indochina we pushed to 100,000 a month the circulation of an MSA country journal which stressed better living through the use of local government and American agricultural aid; helped to strengthen the leadership

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of local officials in agriculture and public health, in conjunction with French psychological warfare assistance; strengthened communications with radio and graphics, and, in conjunction with the USIS, helped to plan psychological materials that furthered American objectives.

In Thailand we have assisted the Government in its information activities that are oriented toward the free world and are anti-Communist.

In the Philippines we have supported economic development programs and technical assistance which has helped materially the Philippine Government's peace and order campaign.

2. (a) What is your estimate of the psychological effectiveness and key reasons therefor?

In Formosa, considerable psychological effect results from mission information activities which improve morale, help to maintain hope among the captive Chinese on the mainland, and help to rally international opposition to Communism.

In Thailand, an indication of the effectiveness of our work is the increasing production of Thai government information materials that credit the United States with unselfish assistance to the Thai people's welfare in health, agriculture, education and irrigation.

In Indochina, written responses to our country journal and our radio programs increase and we have discovered wide-spread interest and awareness of American support in isolated communities.

(b) What new evidence emerged during the quarter concerning psychological effectiveness of activities occurring before the period being reported?

In Formosa there is increasing evidence of improved morale among the people and continuing reports of interest in the mission's information activities not only on Formosa but among Chinese prisoners of war in Korea, who, it has been reported, have requested the United Nations Command to supply them with materials produced by MSA's Formosa Information Office, such as its rural publication called "Harvest".

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3. What significant progress has been made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means for contributing to the national psychological effort?

The capabilities of MSA's Formosa mission will be increased by the provision of 6,000 low-cost radio receiving sets. These will be distributed to Formosan farmers associations and other organizations in rural areas as a part of the Joint (American-Chinese) Commission on Rural Reconstruction project to improve communications between the Chinese government and its people.

In Indochina, plans have been completed for the training of 352 propagandists for use with mobile units in information halls and other places.

4. What need is felt for changes in policies, plans, capabilities, or organization with a view to effective conduct of national psychological effort?

MSA's information officer in Formosa suggests that the effectiveness of the American psychological effort could be considerably enhanced by the use of the Communists' own tactics against them in propaganda warfare. He recommends that we lower our sights from the intellectuals to the masses, that we use down to earth language and that we aim at the pocket-books of the people in order to capture their minds.

Our information officer in Bangkok believes that MSA's information program is moving strongly and well and suggests no change in policies, plans or capabilities.

MSA's information officer in Saigon recommends that we take an active role in encouraging joint US-French-Vietnamese participation in all propaganda and educational dissemination activities. The US and France would be in a supporting role to the Vietnamese.

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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - Far East

1. The international role of Japan in the post-treaty era?

The Thai people are unwilling to see Japan dominate Southeast Asia politically and economically.

In the Philippines the Japanese treaty has become a domestic political football and Philippine-Jap relations are touchy.

In Indochina Japan is sought as a source of material supply and there is a general attitude of respect for Japanese technical progress and a desire to emulate it.

2. What changes have occurred in level, character and effectiveness of U.S. propaganda activities?

There has been little change except in Indochina where techniques and objectives have become sharpened with experience and increasing emphasis has been placed upon the dissemination of educational material and the support of local institutions.

3. What new evidence is there on hand concerning the psychological impact of U.S. technical assistance in under-developed areas?

Evidence continues to accumulate along lines similar to those in the past that indicate U.S. technical assistance has a strong psychological impact on the people of the Far East.

Increasingly large numbers of farmers on Formosa have requested technical assistance with its concomitant psychological impact. In Indochina, villages have presented scrolls of thanks to MSA. More applications for technical training in the United States have been received.

4. To what extent have psychological objectives been furthered through your activities in collaboration with (a) major international organizations such as the United Nations?

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In Formosa, UNESCO is just beginning to operate. MSA's mission in Manila works closely with United Nations agencies, particularly in health, agriculture and education. In Cambodia, one of the Associated States of Indochina, our mission cooperates with UNESCO and the World Health Organization.

(b) Non-governmental organizations and individuals in the United States?

In Formosa, U.S. press and radio interest is increasing and this is judged to be psychologically helpful by our mission there.

(c) Federal agencies other than MSA and member PSB agencies?

None, except USIS with which our missions feel cooperation is worthwhile.

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